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I. INTRODUCTION

A defining characteristic of all communities, whether families,
tribes, guilds, firms, universities, unions, municipalities or states,
*
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is the strength and nature of the relationships between their
members. Whether these relationships are based on kinship,
religious connection, language, mutual economic interest, social
class, political affiliation or cultural heritage, whether they are
organized hierarchically or polycentrically, it is fair to say that we
expect them to be richer, more permanent and more deeply
imbedded within the identities of the members of these communities than are the relationships among members of different
communities.
The Canadian identity, because of needs generated by a
relatively small population, vast territory, dual languages and
immigrant heritage, has been defined by the strength and integrity
of our relationships with one another as Canadians. Unlike many
other nations, we have not defined ourselves as a nation of
atomistic individuals, we do not have international ambitions or
symbols of international supremacy to draw us together. It is the
strength and depth of the internal relations among Canadians
which explain why, as Canadians, we respond to the needs of
fishers in Newfoundland when the fishery collapses; why we
respond to the needs of farming communities in the Prairies in the
face of crop devastation or collapsing international commodity
markets; why we support the development of Northern communities; why one of our most important national symbols is represented by our sharing of health and medical costs; why we support
the preservation and enhancement of the distinctiveness of
Quebec culture and language; why we support economic
transition strategies in Ontario in the face of changing trade
relations; and it is why we struggle with issues of diversity and
multi-culturalism in Canada perhaps more than any other country
in the world.
The premise of this article on the current status of the Canadian
economic union and the meaning of the Internal Trade
Agreement (the "Agreement") on that union, is that the union
describes the economic relations among individual Canadians.
The union is not comprised of the interconnections among
political jurisdictions. The Canadian economic union, when
conceived as the product of the relations between individual
Canadians, is the market. We have decided that our material wellbeing as individuals and as a community is best served by decentralizing economic power and thereby permitting individuals,
whether alone or in groups, to act relatively autonomously in
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deciding when, with whom and how they should arrange their
affairs in an effort to achieve self-defined goals. The essential
nature of the Canadian economic union is one of untold millions of
privately arranged economic market relations - subject to
regulation, of course, but nonetheless defined by private firms and
individuals.
Depending on the context, relatively discrete and identifiable
markets will develop within neighbourhoods, within urban areas,
between urban areas and rural hinterlands, between remote
resource communities and international buyers, and within
relatively large geographic regions -ultimately, some markets in
Canada will be national in scope and in many cases the Canadian
market will form part of a larger international market. Thus the
Canadian economic union consists of numbers of individual
relations which, in a unitary state and without redistributive
policies, would be arranged according to a pattern which
individuals believe would maximize their personal welfare as
Canadians.
In the absence of governmental policies (whether developed at
the federal or provincial level) intended to benefit particular
individuals within specific regions within Canada, the scope and
scale of market relations within Canada should and will be defined
and shaped by population densities, the presence or absence of
biophysical resources, by communication and transportation
infrastructures, by the availability of capital, by the comparative
advantage of the persons comprising particular communities
within Canada, and by geography and weather. The Canadian
economic union -with whom one trades, when, on what terms
and under what conditions -will be defined by private individuals
and firms seeking to increase or maximize their respective wealth
or welfare subject only to those "natural" constraints which will
produce markets, determine their shape and scale, or in some
instances preclude their development. The Canadian economic
union is, in that sense, the product of individual Canadians trading
with one other. The "union" is the absence of the state beyond its
role in the recognition of property rights, in providing for the
enforceability of contracts, and in correcting for market failures
should they occur.'
1 The

ultimate shape of the Canadian social, cultural and political union will, of course, be
determined by important redistributive policies - both through direct and indirect
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However, as a federal state, the scope and scale of the Canadian
economic union are also defined by the political boundaries of
Confederation which were established without regard to the then
existing, let alone the present, configuration of markets in
Canada. We have decided, for good or bad, to establish sovereign
provinces with authority to legislate with respect to exchange
relations - contract, property and trade - within the province.
Constitutional decisions, almost from the time of Confederation,
have vested a considerable portion of potential regulatory
authority over markets in provincial governments. The result is a
fragmentation of markets which would otherwise be organized
without regard to provincial b ~ u n d a r i e sWe
. ~ are thus confronted
with one of the essential dilemmas of federalism - when should
economic relations exist, be defined or be regulated at the national
level, and at the level of subnational political units. In the absence
of pressing arguments in favour of market fragmentation, it is my
position that national markets - which will include many,
although not all, aspects of transportation services; communication services; investment and financial services; the creation,
distribution and supply of energy and natural resources; and so on
-call for definition and regulation at the national level. The other
side of this position is held by "provincialists" -those who argue
that the federal government itself will engage in marketfragmenting and market-distorting policies; that local governments can engage in public policy formation which is much more
sensitive to local welfare; and that provincial trade barriers and
protectionist strategies can be addressed, ex post, through
voluntary provincial agreemenk3
The current debate concerning the Canadian economic union
began in the early-1980s negotiations leading up to the constitutional amendments of 1982. In 1983 the Ontario Economic
Council published Federalism and the Canadian Economic
U n i ~ n a, ~collection of essays edited by Professors Trebilcock,
taxation and through social welfare programs. However, the economic union is the
marketplace.
See P . * ~ o n a h a n"At
,
Doctrine's Twilight; The Structure of Canadian Federalism"
(19841.34 U.T.L.J. 47.
3 s e e flatters and R.J. Lipsey, "Common Ground for the Common Market", Essays in
International Economics (Instit. Res. Pub. Pol., 1983).
M.J. Trebilcock, J.R.S. Prichard, T.J. Courchen, J. Walley eds. (Toronto, U. of T. Press,
1983). See also, A.E. Safarian, Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration, constitutional study prepared for the Government of Canada (1973); The Honourable Jean
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Prichard, Courchene and Whalley in which the authors addressed
that central question - which level of government should have
authority over which economic activities - which defines
Canadian economic federalism. That collection initiated a decadelong debate about which level of government was responsible for
distortions in the Canadian common market, about the magnitude
and distribution of the welfare losses associated with trade
barriers, and about the most appropriate political response to the
fragmentation of the Canadian marketplace. I am not going to
repeat any of what was said then -my sense of the literature is
that not much has been added to the very perceptive analyses
(descriptive, empirical and theoretical) contained in that
c~llection.~
In July 1994 - more than ten years after this seminal series of
essays was written - the federal government, ten provinces and
two territories signed what is referred to as the Agreement on
Internal Trade. The Agreement is presented as an almost mythic
"voluntary agreement" symbolizing the ability of ten provinces
and the federal government to work co-operatively to further the
national good.6 It attempts to bring Canada together; to re-orient
Canada on its historical EasttWest axis. However, I argue in this
essay that the symbolism of the Internal Trade Agreement, while
important, is not enough. The substance of the Agreement offers
Canadians, as they define their economic relations with each other
within Canada, substantially less than international trade agreements offer Canadians as they define their economic relations with
foreign firms and citizens. I also attempt to explain how and why
Chretien, Minister of Justice, Securing the Canadian Economic Union in the Constitution,
discussion paper published by the Government of Canada (1980); Frank Flatters and R.J.
Lipsey, supra, footnote 3.
5 For more recent work, see William B.P. Robson, Dynamic Tensions, Markets, Federalism
and Canada's Economic Future: Policy Review and Outlook (C.D. Howe Institute, 1992);
J. Quinn, "Federalism and Foreign Economic Relations" (1985), 10 Can.-U.S. L.J. 197;
Perspectives on the Canadian Economic Union, Mark Krasnick, ed., Vol. 60, Royal
Commission on the Ewnomic Union and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto,
U. of T. Press, 1986); R. Broadway, The Constitutional Division of Powers: An Economic
Perspective (Ewnomic Council of Canada, 1992).
6The Agreement was presented by the federal government and the then Liberal
government in Quebec as evidence of the "new" flexible federalism which offered
increased autonomy for Quebec as part of Canada. Perversely, however, the Agreement
may represent a nascent international economic trade agreement should Quebec sovereigntists succeed in their quest to establish an independent Quebec state in North
America.
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this came about -the explanation is linked to economic, political
and constitutional events which cannot be separated from the
issue of internal trade.
II. THE INTERNAL TRADE AGREEMENT

- A N OVERVIEW

The core of the Agreement is contained in the following
principles. First, the provinces agreed to a general "Reciprocal
Non-Discrimination" principle -provinces must accord to goods,
services, persons and investments of other provinces no less
favourable treatment than they accord to their own goods,
services, persons and investments. Second, the provinces agreed
to recognize the right of exit and entry -provinces may not adopt
any measures that restrict or prevent the movement of persons,
goods, services or investments across provincial boundaries.
Third, the provinces agreed that provincial regulatory measures
will not operate to create obstacles to inter-provincial trade.
Fourth, the provinces agreed that these trade liberalization
principles would be subject to exceptions for legitimate provincial
objectives. That is, regulatory measures inconsistent with the
above principles are permissible if the purpose of the measure is to
achieve legitimate objectives that are not unduly restrictive. Legitimate objectives include the pursuit of public security and safety,
public order, protection of human, animal or plant life or health,
protection of the environment, consumer protection, protection
of the health and well-being of workers and affirmative action
programs. Fifth, the parties agreed to a set of non-judicial dispute
resolution measures and to continue negotiations in respect of
those components of the agreement which were not concluded.
Ill. T W O COMPETING VISIONS OF THE INTERNAL TRADE
AGREEMENT

The meaning of the Internal Trade Agreement can best be
understood in the telling of two very different stories - one told
by a nationalist, the other by a provincialist. The reader can
choose for herself or himself which one accords with one's sense of
the reality of Canada; which of the two stories describes a nation.
The nationalist story begins with the assertion that the
Agreement confirms the primacy of the Canadian economic
union. The Agreement is evidence that there is no necessary or
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logical inconsistency between the extreme provincial political
sovereignty which characterizes Canadian federalism and the
achievement of a high degree of economic integration. The
Agreement confirms that autonomous provinces can voluntarily
come together to negotiate a multi-lateral arrangement which will
respond effectively to market fragmentation, destructive competition for investment, excessive enforcement and compliance costs
and duplication in program delivery. Moreover, the nationalist
would view the Agreement as merely the starting point in the
process of voluntary, multi-lateral reconciliation and reduction of
trade barriers, and the nationalist would identify a number of
weaknesses in the Agreement which demand further action.
First, the Agreement is directed primarily at preventing the
introduction of new barriers to trade. The fundamental principle
which defines the Agreement is not the elimination of existing
barriers to trade, but rather merely a commitment in Article 102'
that the provinces will not establish new barriers to internal trade.
While other very important fundamental principles affirm "equal
treatment" of goods, services, people and investment and
recognize that provinces will reconcile conflicting standards, the
Agreement is fundamentally flawed in its failure to impose or
recognize any fundamental obligation to eliminate existing
barriers to trade.
Second, the Agreement fails to attend to the issue of duplication
of services between the federal and provincial governments. The
scope of the Agreement confirms the critical need for further
agreements to address the costs of multi-provincial regulatory
activity, as well as the increasing competitive costs of government
procurement and related incentive programs. The categories of
trade barriers addressed in the agreement - non-tariff standard
barriers, government procurement policies, local presence and
residency requirements for investment, labour mobility,
consumer-related measures and standards, agricultural and food
goods, alcoholic beverages, natural resources, transportation,
incentive programs and environmental protection -overwhelmingly illustrate the breadth of the trade-distorting barriers that
-

~ r t z 102(3)
e
provides that the provinces, in the application of the Agreement, shall be
guided by a number of principles, including Article 102(3)(a), which mandates that the
provinces "will not establish new bamers to internal trade and will facilitate the crossboundary movement of persons, goods, services and investments within Canada".
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have been developed over decades by both federal and provincial
governments. However, in many of these areas, the Agreement
merely establishes processes and structures for future negotiations
which may (or may not) provide for specific measures designed to
reduce or eliminate provincial trade barriers and other protectionist strategies.
A third concern of nationalists is the erosion of the principle of
internal free trade through a myriad of exceptions to free trade
principles which permeate the Agreement. This underlying
weakness of the Agreement is best illustrated by Article 102.4:
4. In applying the principles set out in paragraph 3, the Parties recognize:
(a) the need for full disclosure of information, legislation, regulations,
policies and practices that have the potential to impede an open,
efficient and stable domestic market;
(b) the need for exceptions and transition periods;
(c) the need for exceptions required to meet regional development
objectives in Canada;
(d) the need for supporting administrative, dispute settlement and
compliance mechanisms that are accessible, timely, credible and
effective; and
(e) the need to take into account the importance of environmental
objectives, consumer protection and labour standards.

In the result, three of the five interpretative guidelines support the
continuation of trade barriers - even at the outset the parties
recognize the need for exceptions to free trade principles, the need
for exceptions to meet regional development objectives and the
need to take into account environmental, consumer protection
and labour standards.
A fourth concern of economic nationalists is the Agreement's
inadequate treatment of government procurement policies. While
chapter 5 of the Agreement, which deals with procurement
policies, includes its own fundamental "reciprocal non-discrimination" provision, Article 504, which specifically refers to equal
treatment and most favoured province treatment of construction
contractors, operates so as to exclude a substantial number of
Crown corporations, municipal corporations and other privatelpublic enterprises from t h e Agreement's procurement
provisions.* Given the economic, social and political significance
8See Internal Trade Agreement at pp. 65-83. However, it should be noted that the
Agreement includes a commitment to further negotiations to extend the Agreement to
these entities (Article 502.4).

Heinonline - - 2 5 Can. Bus. L.J. 2 6 4 1 9 9 5

1995)

The Internal Trade Agreement 265

of these institutions to the Canadian political economy, their
exclusion substantially weakens the force of the Agreement.
Moreover, their exclusion suggests that governments have a
relatively simple mechanism to introduce new trade barriers in the
future. More significantly, Article 508 provides for the indefinite
continuation of regional and economic development programs
which are exempt from the procurement provisions of the
Agreement so long as provinces list the programs, prepare an
annual written report on program operations, and conduct a
review of the programs by 1998 in light of their regional and
economic development objectives. Finally, the Agreement
excludes "intra-governmental" contracts entirely from the
operation of the procurement regulations.
Fifth, the trade-off between efficient national markets and the
preservation of provincial political sovereignty is manifest in two
particular provisions of the Agreement. Article 301 provides that
nothing in the Agreement alters the legislative authority of the
provinces - of course, no contractual agreement could preclude
provinces from exercising their constitutional powers to alter the
provisions of the Agreement nil ate rally.^ More specifically,
Article 404 of the Agreement permits provincial governments to
depart from fundamental equal treatment obligations where they
are pursuing "legitimate provincial objectives":
Where it is established that a measure is inconsistent with Article 401,
Article 402 or 403, that measure is still permissible under this Agreement
where it can be demonstrated that:
(a) the purpose of the measure is to achieve a legitimate objective;
(b) the measure does not operate to impair unduly the access of
persons, goods, services or investments of a Party that meet that
legitimate objective;
(c) the measure is not more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve
that legitimate objective; and
(d) the measure does not create a disguised restriction on trade.

As a result, provinces may depart from the non-protectionist
directive in Article 401 simply by demonstrating that the purpose
(and not the effect) of a regulatory measure is to achieve a
provincial "legitimate objective". Legitimate objectives, defined
9 This exclusion emphasizes the inherent limitation of using a contractual vehicle to address

provincial trade barriers, as compared to earlier initiatives which would have constitutionalized the limitations on provincial authority to enact legislation affecting inter-provincial
trade.
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in Article 201, encompass virtually all significant areas of
provincial regulatory jurisdiction - public safety, public order,
protection of human, animal or plant life, protection of the
environment, consumer protection, protection of the health,
safety and well being of workers, and affirmative action programs
for disadvantaged groups. Moreover, Annex 405.2 provides that
provinces may adopt and maintain regulatory measures which
they "consider . . . appropriate" to achieve a legitimate objective.
The combination of these provisions means that provinces are free
to engage in a broad range of regulatory policies unencumbered by
restraints imposed under the Internal Trade Agreement.
In addition, the Agreement contains an array of exceptions
which will result in continuing trade distortions. The exceptions
include :
(a) energy goods and energy services;lO
(b) restrictions relating to occupational qualifications;ll
(c) procurement practices by a substantial number of
government-related agencies and procurement
practices relating to regional and economic development purposes;12
(d) economic incentives which do not "directly" result in
an enterprise relocating outside a province;l3
(e) restrictions on labour mobility which relate to social
policy measures,14 or which are designed to achieve
legitimate objectives including "labour market
development";l5
(f) consumer measures to achieve legitimate objectives
which, in this context, include the promotion of
economic interests16 as well as the physical safety of
consumers;l7
lo The

chapter of the Agreement dealing with energy simply states that energy will be the
subject of future negotiations envisioned in Article 1810.
11 See Article 709.
12 Article 508.
13 See Annex 608.3(4).
l4 Social policy measures include, but are not limited to, different labour standards and
codes, minimum wages, unemployment insurance qualification periods and social assistance benefits.
15 See Article 709. Other legitimate objectives of labour policy include such broad
categories as public security, public order, protection of human, animal or plant life or
health, protection of the environment, consumer protection, worker safety, affirmative
action programs, and provision of adequate social and health services to all geographic
regions of a province.
16 See Article 810. Economic interests are defined in extremely broad terms and include,
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(g) supply-side management programs18 and other nontechnical trade barriers applicable to agricultural
products;
(h) a broad range of barriers, both bilateral and multilateral, relating to the wine and beer industry;lg
(i) management programs relating to natural resources
including fisheries, forestry, water and mineral
resources;m
(j) measures respecting culture or cultural i n d u s t r i e ~ ; ~ ~
(k) the regulation of financial institutions and financial
services ;22
(1) a range of regional economic development programs
which do not "unduly" impair access of persons,
goods, services or investments of another province;23
and
(m) a range of regulatory requirements applicable to the
transportation sector.24
Various arguments have been offered to support these diversions from the pursuit of the Canadian economic union. First, the
provinces argue that provincial sovereignty permits, indeed
encourages, regulatory experimentation and competition which
produce benefits which exceed those associated with the reduction
or elimination of trade restrictions. However, there is considerable evidence that trade restrictions unequivocally reduce
aggregate national economic well-being. Proponents of the
benefits of inter-provincial regulatory competition should be
required to demonstrate the economic benefits associated with
that position. Moreover, regulatory experimentation can be
but are not limited to, quality of goods, services and suppliers, information disclosure
about the goods, services and suppliers, contractual fairness, access to redress mechanisms, security of consumer deposits, prevention of unfair trade practices and protection
of privacy.
17 Ibid.
l8 Indeed, Article 902 obliges the parties to implement an action plan towards the development of sustainable orderly marketing systems in the Canadian dairy, poultry and egg
industries.
l9 See Chapter 10 of the Agreement.
20 See Article 1102.
21 See Article 1802.
Article 1807 excludes measures adopted by governments or agencies which exercise
regulatory jurisdiction in relation to financial institutions or financial services.
23 See Article 1802, "Regional Economic Development".
See Annex 1410.1.

"
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achieved by a resourceful federal government willing to
implement trial policies at the regional or local level. Finally, the
potential benefits of regulatory competition cannot justify the
wholesale exclusion of broad economic sectors from the
Agreement's ambit.
A second argument favouring broad exceptions from the
Agreement focuses on the diversity of social and cultural values
within Canada - regulatory policies which maximize aggregate
social welfare in British Columbia or New Brunswick may not
achieve that end in Saskatchewan or Quebec. While that position
may explain some exceptions (in particular, exceptions for
cultural industries), assertions of provincial social and cultural
diversity fail to explain or justify differing provincial regulatory
polices in areas such as communications, investment, regional
development, financial services, government procurement and so
on. I think we make far too much of the argument that social
welfare will be maximized through decentralized policies which
ensure that local public goods, like consumer protection, are
designed and delivered at the local leve1.25 It may very well be that
local tastes are simply not as distinct as local and provincial politicians would have us believe them to be. Countries as diverse as
Britain, France, Germany and Italy, with consumer markets at
least as sophisticated as Canada's and with populations two, three
and four times as large, prosper without multiple consumer
protection regimes.26
In the end, the Internal Trade Agreement, the nationalist would
argue, is an important starting point in the incremental, voluntary
reconciliation of trade barriers among provinces. While it is a
unique and critical opening move in building a new economic
partnership among provinces, it does not go nearly far enough.
See A. Breton and A. Scott, The Economic Constitution of Federal States (Toronto, U.of
T. Press. 1978).
26If there' is an argument for local regulation of consumer markets, it exists at the
community or urban level. There are certainly many consumer markets which are quite
local in nature and where relevant information which would be necessary for regulation
can only be efficiently obtained at the local level. Local regulation in the consumer
context would, with few exceptions not likely result in significant trade barriers.
Producer interests could not effectively organize at this level of politics. In many cases,
even if producer organizational costs were relatively low, the benefits of the trade barrier
would be even lower. Finally, few local communities would be able to exercise sufficient
leverage, in light of the opportunity costs of excluding entry, to adopt exclusionary
regulatory policies affecting consumer goods.
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A second, very different story is told by a provincialist who
argues that the Agreement goes much too far in obliging provinces
to pursue national trade objectives and to further national
economic interests, when the appropriate role for the provinces is
the pursuit of measures to serve the legitimate, albeit narrower,
social interests of their local populations. Provincialists favour
inter-provincial competition and argue that those who do not
consider themselves better off under particular provincial regimes
can exercise a much more effective political voice at the provincial
level than they could federally, or can simply "vote with their
feet" and choose a more attractive set of provincial policies.27
As well, provincialists argue that the Agreement is inadequate
to protect local and provincial interests - provincialists take the
position that measures which are designed to benefit local
consumers should not be subject to any constraints which, while
potentially increasing overall economic well-being in Canada,
would almost certainly result in a net loss to local residents. The
nature of federalism is that only the provinces can and should
address local demands which cannot be effectively communicated
or received at the federal level of government. Many regulatory
measures, especially in provinces outside of the traditional
manufacturing base in central Canada, are intended to address
their significant imbalance in economic and political power
relative to the "centre". In the absence of strong federal
regulatory intervention, provinces must be able to pursue
regulatory agendas which attempt to redress the concentration of
economic power in Ontario and Quebec.
A third concern of provincialists is that the Internal Trade
Agreement will have a chilling effect on regulatory action at the
provincial level. The expected benefits of much regulatory intervention, such as environmental and consumer protection
27 The

view of provincialists toward the document is unlikely to be totally negative. In
particular, the Agreement applies to the activities of the federal level of government.
This inclusion addresses long-standing complaints of several provinces that certain
federal government market-distorting policies enacted in the name of the "national
interest" have, in reality, been motivated by regional interests acting within the federal
government to pursue transfers of wealth from one region to another. In addition,
provincialists argue that the Agreement achieves an admirable balance between the
efficiencies of national markets and the needs of local communities. They would argue
that the "legitimate objectives" exceptions are vital in order to protect values which
cannot be calculated in economic terms - including concerns with the distribution of
wealth among provincial residents, the preservation of local cultures and so on.
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measures, are notoriously difficult to quantify - and thus it may
not be possible for provincial governments to demonstrate that the
purpose of a particular measure was to achieve a legitimate
objective. At the very least, the existence of the provision means
that provinces may decide to withdraw from measures which may
have long-term benefits to the residents where those benefits are
not identifiable and measurable in the short term.
Fourth, the requirement that provinces must demonstrate that
measures inconsistent with the agreement but which attempt to
meet legitimate objectives are not more trade restrictive than is
necessary will lead governments to adopt the least intrusive and
perhaps relatively less effective measures. To use consumer
protection legislation as an example, less intrusive regulatory
measures - such as requirements for performance rather than
design standards, insurance requirements and warnings or
disclosure requirements rather than licensing or certification
measures - may have significant adverse distributive consequences to particular groups of consumers and certainly present a
risk of less effective regulatory impact than do the more intrusive
regulatory instruments available to governments.
Fifth, Article 806 which prohibits the application of residency
requirements on individuals doing business within a province
ignores the very real difficulty which consumers and regulators
face in effectively controlling the activity of extra-provincial
businesses. Those who favour provincial regulatory authority
argue that provincial governments must be able to establish
residency requirements on natural persons as a licensing or registration condition. Consumers cannot be expected to pursue
defendant suppliers outside provincial boundaries, and trade
practice legislation and regulatory compliance sanctions in general
are most effective when they are applied to individual defendants
and not merely to their firms.
The general requirement in Annex 405.1.7 of the Agreement
that standards must be developed as performance or competence
rather than as design standards will permit uncontrolled experimentation by industry which will be able to comply with regulatory
standards at the lowest possible cost, but may use that freedom to
design products or services which may simultaneously put the
safety and health of consumers at risk. If performance standards
are to be utilized, regulators must be able to assess the particular
design selected by the industry to determine, ex ante, if that design
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adequately addresses the risk at issue and to confirm that the
design does not generate additional or different risks to consumer
welfare.
In the end, the provincialist argues that the citizens of provinces
deserve at least the same degree of respect within inter-provincial
trade agreements as do citizens of states in international trade
agreements. National welfare must take second place to the
welfare of local residents, pursued by provincial governments as
their agents. Viewed through this lens, the Internal Trade
Agreement goes much too far in demanding that provincial
governments take into account the interests of firms acting in
national or international markets, or in insisting that provincial
regulatory authority be circumscribed in order to maximize
aggregate national wealth and productivity.
IV. WHY SUCH DIFFERENT VIEWPOINTS?

How then does one explain those very different stories? The
search for the answer to this question takes one beyond the
Agreement itself. To understand why both these stories can be
told simultaneously, one is forced to confront one's conception of
Canada and to understand what it means to be a Canadian. The
answer to the question lies in a decade of fundamental changes in
Canada's social, economic and political order during which our
modern understanding of trade agreements was being shaped.
These changes increased the need and desire for an internal trade
agreement while simultaneously ensuring that severe and indeed
intolerable limits would be placed on its scope and efficacy.
The Canadian economic union represents only one particular
component of the complex internal relationships which define us
as Canadians. It is not possible to understand what has occurred to
the Canadian economic union without moving beyond the
extraordinarily complex, inter-connected exchange relations
among economic factors which characterize market economies.
The Canadian economic union is part of a social fabric which is
comprised of a range of political sovereignties and allegiances
associated with multiple jurisdictions in a federal state, the
existence of strong regional cultural identities, diverse attitudes at
the regional level towards the role of the Canadian state and social
security, and conceptions of the role of Quebec in Canada.
Several transforming events occurred during the decade since
we started talking about internal trade.28 These events have
z8
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I use the term "transforming" to describe fundamental, effectively irreversible changes
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changed Canada permanently. They are largely responsible for
the fact that we finally saw the federal and provincial governments
enter into a trade agreement, and, paradoxically, for the fact that
the trade agreement accomplished so little. These events have,
sadly, worked together to create a nation which may be rapidly
disintegrating around us.
1. The Free Trade Agreements

Canada entered into a Free Trade Agreement and then a North
American Free Trade Agreement - first with the United States
and then with the United States and Mexico. An intense debate
occurred within Canada focusing on the winners and losers within
Canada created by those trade agreements; on the appropriate
transition strategies necessary to respond to changes in the
Canadian economy associated with those agreements; on the
impact on environmental, social and labour policies associated
with competition in a North American market; on how Canadian
cultural identity would be affected by open North American
markets; and on the future we would face without those agreements.
The trade agreements demonstrated to many (although
certainly not to all) Canadians that freer trade could bring
substantial economic benefits - and avoid more serious negative
economic consequences -to Canadians. The international agreements made the federal government acutely aware that its success
in future international negotiations and its ability to avoid
challenges to the existing agreements would be jeopardized if it
could not assure foreign nations of co-operation by the provinces.
The Agreements also created a climate in which trade agreements
were seen as part of the current popular political agendas of all
main-stream parties. The existence of these agreements increased
the likelihood of extra-national challenges to provincial as well as
federal policies which, while they might be directed at internal
trade issues, would be challengeable under the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the Canada-United States Trade
in the way in which Canada is governed and thus changes which define the Canadian
political economy. In that sense, elections, treaties, constitutional reform and economic
recessions, in s o far as they exact far-reaching and relatively permanent changes to
Canada's social, economic and political order, are treated similarly.
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Agreement as interfering with the flow of goods across international borders.29 All of these developments offered considerable
support for those who argued for the development of an internal
trade agreement among the provinces.
At the same time, however, there can be little disagreement
with the proposition that the two free trade agreements have
brought Canadians much closer to the United States than we were
a decade ago. In so far as we define ourselves in relation to others,
the number and kinds of relations which comprise Canada have
shifted from an EasttWest to a NorthISouth axis and toward
nations beyond Canadian borders. Provincialists, from British
Columbia, for example, will argue that there is, in truth, little
need for a pan-Canadian trade agreement. British Columbia may
now, and will certainly have in the future, stronger economic links
with Asia and the western American States than it has to much of
Canada. Firms in many provinces need effective trade agreements
with the United States and Asian countries more than they need
agreements with most Canadian provinces. Those extra-national
jurisdictions have the technological expertise, populations and
resource needs which Canadian firms cannot afford to ignore.
With continued progress on World Trade Organization treaties
and with the introduction of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement over
the past decade, the need for a "Canadian" Free Trade
Agreement has been significantly attenuated.
Canada's participation in two international trade agreements
thus had a two-edged impact on internal trade strategies. It
offered support to those who favoured trade agreements in
principle and evidence to some that trade agreements could work
to the benefit of participating states; but the international agreements simultaneously reduced the interest of, and need for, many
Canadian businesses to look to trading partners within other
regions of Canada and thus offered support for those who would
retain strong provincial barriers within the umbrella of the
rhetoric of free trade in the Internal Trade Agreement. Put
simply, the sequencing of the international and internal trade
agreements was wrong.
29 See Robson, supra, footnote 5, at pp. 72-4.
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The Constitutional Crisis

Canadians have lived through a decade of constitutional crises
as the Canadian constitution was patriated; as the Meech Lake
Accord was developed and then failed; and as the Charlottetown
constitutional accord was negotiated and then soundly rejected by
Canadians in a national referendum. The failure to bring Quebec
into the Canadian constitutional family through constitutional
reform has led to measures, including the Internal Trade
Agreement, which are presented as efforts to bring Quebec into
Canada, albeit as part of an economic compact rather than
through a constitutional acc0rd.3~
However, while the constitutional agenda might explain the
existence of the Internal Trade Agreement, the Charlottetown
Accord, in particular, was an extraordinarily decentralizing
document. While some participants would have wanted more,
even the consensus reached was a product of the federal
government agreeing to what would have been an extraordinary
degree of provincial authority and autonomy within a loose
political arrangement called Canada. While the accord failed the
test of a national referendum in most parts of Canada, the underlying governmental politics which it reflected remain extant.
Provincial governments (and I might add, First Nations communities) were emboldened by their success in securing the
agreement of the federal government to transfer political
authority to both groups. That transfer can and has taken place
through the incremental withdrawal of a federal government
presence in national broadcasting, by reductions in federal
funding of and responsibility for social and educational programs,
in the optional transfer to provinces of primary control over
immigration, and among other areas of economic and social
activity. The result is that the provinces were able to exercise
considerable leverage in shaping the Internal Trade Agreement to
ensure continued provincial autonomy and sovereignty over
significant components of the national economy.
It is widely known that the existence and certainly the timing of the Internal Trade
Agreement were directly related to the then forthcoming provincial election in Quebec.
The Agreement was negotiated with the hope that support for a separatist government
might be reduced if the then Liberal Quebec government could point to the direct
economic benefits of a renewed economic federalism represented by the Internal Trade
Agreement. It is impossible to know if that strategy succeeded in fact. It did not, we
know, result in the defeat of the challenge presented by a separatist government.
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Again, the connection between the Internal Trade Agreement
and Quebec independence made the existence of an Agreement
inevitable, but simultaneously assured that it could riot accomplish
the national economic integrative agenda which would have been
expected in a trade agreement. Certainly, while the Internal Trade
Agreement had to be perceived as bringing Quebec into Canada,
it could not interfere with Quebec cultural autonomy and
authority to address provincial social policy issues. Meanwhile few
provinces would agree to a "distinct economic status" for Quebec
in the Internal Trade Agreement, any more than they could agree,
given the referendum, to distinct political status for Quebec in a
constitutional document.
The Internal Trade Agreement confirms what many suspect that we have closer relations both with those who live outside of
our national borders, as well as those who live within our own
respective provincial borders than we do with those who live
within other provinces inside Canada's borders. In so far as we
define ourselves in relation to others, the increasingly effective
political autonomy and authority of the provinces has meant that
the number and kinds of relations which comprise Canada have
shifted from a trans-provincial East/West axis to a number of
intra-provincial and inter-national axes. It is remarkable how
many Canadians, especially in the West, have developed a psychological distance from the rest of Canada -they see themselves as
part of a new Pacific Rim economic regional arrangement, as part
of a "northwestamerican" culture as much as they see themselves
as part of Canada. The result is that while provinces would enter
into a trade agreement, they would not agree to forgo the real
political power acquired during the past decade.
3.

The Transformation of the Canadian State

The past decade has seen a quite extraordinary transformation
of the way in which individual Canadians conceive of the role of
the modern Canadian federal state. The end of the decade brought
with it a recession which was not only the deepest and broadest in
50 years, but which left Canada with unemployment levels among
the highest in the developed world. This recession for the first time
struck at the manufacturing base of Central Canada, and finally
made ordinary Canadians recognize the importance of responding
to concerns about regulatory costs, productivity and economic
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growth if we were to remain independent as a nation. The social
and economic costs of the recession perhaps persuaded ordinary
Canadians, as well as their political representatives, of the
pressing need to deal with the regulatory costs associated with
internal trade barriers between provinces.
At the same time significantly higher personal income taxes in
Canada - as compared to those paid by citizens of the United
States, our most obvious companion - and a highly visible
national sales tax have significantly reduced the ability of the
federal as well as provincial governments to engage in new social
programs. They have combined to create palpable animosity,
towards governments in general and the federal government in
particular. For much of the past decade Canada was led by an
extraordinarily unpopular government and Prime Minister,
resulting, in the most recent federal election, in the virtual elimination at the federal level. Of one of Canada's oldest and most
powerful political parties. The disappearance of a national party in
Canada occurred as two regional parties experienced meteoric
ascendencies and captured substantial numbers of seats in Quebec
and Western Canada. If anything, regionalism within federal
politics exacerbated the provinces' distrust of federal institutions
and magnified provincial concerns that they must be able to anticipate and react to federal regional redistributive policies through
the establishment of protectionist trade barriers and other
measures.
It seems to me that the provinces, in general, distrust assurances
that they will receive a fair share of national wealth if they leave
regional redistribution to the federal government. That final point
cannot be made too strongly. Provincial trade policy is driven not
only indirectly by provincial social policy agendas, but also
directly by provincial interests in addressing the distributive
impacts of national markets. The issue of federalism and equity the redistribution of the benefits of the market among Canadian
regions - lies at the heart of the dilemma which the Trade
Agreement presents. Ideals of economic equality among
Canadians, and very real concerns with debilitating tax and expenditure competition among provinces, suggests that equity policies
should be addressed federally. However, it seems to me that, in
recent years at least, provincial protectionist measures are most
sensibly explained as efforts which are directed at ensuring that
particular regions receive what they believe is a deserved share of
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economic wealth generated within a national economy. According
to the provinces, too much of our history consists of federal
government policies -so called "equity judgments" -which are
directed at moving disproportionate shares of national wealth to
particular regions, whether for the most compassionate or basest
of motives.31
By assuming regulatory authority over specific economic activities and by using trade barriers to direct economic benefits
directly to firms acting within their borders, provinces assure that
the benefits of those policies flow to and are captured directly by
their citizens. The fact that aggregate economic activity at the
national level may be reduced as a result of the fragmentation of
markets, increased compliance costs, duplication of provincial
policies and program delivery, and elimination of economies of
scale associated with federal government program delivery, is
ignored as provinces compete through protectionist provincial
policies for a larger proportional share of a smaller pie.
Moreover, provincial and federal deficits grew enormously
throughout the decade, resulting in a substantial portion of tax
dollars having to be redirected to debt repayment and a
withdrawal of federal government resources from the provinces.
Both of these developments meant a visible diminution of the role
of the Canadian state in social policy. A trade agreement, to the
degree that it is effective, undoubtedly restricts governments in
pursuing interventionist social policies. The trade agreement that
now defines the Canadian economic union, to the extent that it is
effective, will have that effect. However, there are few governments which have the resources or political will to pursue aggressively interventionist social policies at the federal or provincial
level even if they had an interest in doing so. An internal trade
agreement which preserves most historical trade barriers
produced by existing social and economic policies represents
minimal political costs to most provincial governments, given that
they are unlikely to pursue aggressive social policy agendas in the
near to mid-term future. Thus the diminution of the role of the
state in Canada, in part associated with an economic crisis unparalleled in 50 years, provided support both for those who argued for
the development of an internal trade agreement and for those who
31

In fact, s. 36(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982, now constitutionalizes a commitment to
interregional equity, albeit unenforceable through legal processes.
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knew that an agreement which merely froze barriers would cost
provincial governments very little in forgone opportunities to
achieve provincial social policy objectives.
Finally, the past decade saw the introduction of a Charter of
Rights and Freedoms which simultaneously shifted power away
from representative institutions to the judiciary, transformed
political and public dialogue into legal and curial litigation and
contributed to an emerging Canadian identity as a community of
individuals exercising rights to ensure that we are protected from
each other. The meaning of Canada as a pan-continental
community subject to peace order and good government has been
transformed to a sense of Canadians as individuals protected from
that same government by personal rights as we pursue self-defined
goals unconstrained by the state. The individualization of the
Canadian identity is consistent with an internal trade agreement
which focuses on economic growth at the expense of provinces'
abilities to pursue social policies. At the same time, however, the
diminution in the role of the state associated with the Charter
made it difficult for the federal government to act forcefully in an
effort to reduce trade barriers at the provincial level.
V.

CONCLUSION

Thus the past decade during which the very public dialogue
about the Canadian economic union took place was, at the same
time, a decade which saw Canada and its citizens balkanized,
turned on its axis towards the south, individualized and transformed into a nation of distrustful cynics toward the role of the
Canadian state and, in particular, toward the place of the federal
government's role in establishing and preserving "internal"
national relationships and institutions.
It has been argued that the fragmentation of markets, duplication in program delivery, excessive enforcement and
compliance costs associated with federalism could, in theory, be
overcome by ex post negotiation between provinces. With few
exceptions, these negotiations, perhaps because they are so
visible, or perhaps because the losses to well-organized producer
interests would be so visible and highly focused, may not occur.
The Internal Trade Agreement, in so far as it represents what one
could expect from ex post negotiations, confirms that voluntary
agreement designed to adjust to the costs of federalism do not, in
reality, offer Canadians very much at all.
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The gaps, exclusions and overall weakness of the Internal Trade
Agreement - at least when compared to the North American
Free Trade Agreement - are a product of the historically and
increasingly decentralized nature of Canadian federalism, the
practical and political inability of the federal government to use its
legal authority to act unilaterally to create a common market in
Canada, and the need to offer substantial benefits to all 10
provinces in a multi-lateral bargaining process. Moreover, the
palpable distrust of the federal government which has developed
in recent years,32 the mutual distrust of other provinces and an
economic lens which is now focused outside of Canada, all confirm
the rapidly disintegrating relations among some provinces and
among many ordinary Canadians, as the national economy, like
other national institutions, fails to receive the support it requires.
Put most bluntly, too many provincialists believe, either as
politicians, producers or consumers (but, in my view, mostly as
provincial politicians) that they will be better off if they can
exercise power at the provincial, regional or even local level. In an
era of globalization, of rapidly transforming international marketplaces for goods, services and credit, and of increased mobility of
capital and labour even within Canada, I do not fully understand
how Canada as a society will be better off if regulatory authority is
exercised in Regina or Winnipeg, Edmonton or Halifax rather
than Ottawa. Most remarkable and disconcerting of all is that the
Canadian Internal Trade Agreement, an intra-national agreement
supposedly representing the collective interests of all Canadians,
should look so much like, but which perhaps accomplishes so
much less than, the North American Free Trade Agreement -an
international agreement between three sovereign nations
motivated only by national self-interest.

E. H. Fry, "The Role of State and Federal Governments in Canada-U.S. Sectoral
Integration" (1985), 10 Can.-U.S. L.J. 169 at pp. 176-82.

32 See
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